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ARTICLES
Provisional Review: An Exploratory Essay
on an Alternative Form of Judicial
Review
By PAUL R. DIMOND*

Introduction
The core problem of judicial review under our Constitution is judicial choice: where the Constitution authorizes, but does not compel, a
particular choice, how can the decision of an anti-majoritarian Court be
final and bind the people and their elected representatives consistent with
democratic principles?' The current legitimacy debate has not proven
helpful in solving this problem.
This Article posits an alternative approach to judicial review that
includes five basic elements. First, judicial review would be accepted as a
process in which judicial choice often cannot be avoided in interpreting
the Constitution. Second, the Court's scope of review would extend to
cases involving substantive rights and federalism disputes, as well as to
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University (on leave 1984-85). B.A., 1966, Amherst
College; J.D., 1969, University of Michigan.
1. Some scholars seek to answer this question by appearing to deny it altogether. See,
e.g., Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 93, 123-36 (1983). Sedler argues that the Constitution is
primarily concerned with placing limits on all governmental power. But when presented with
other constitutional functions, such as the establishment of a representative form of government with amendments guaranteeing broad suffrage, Sedler is compelled to address the question. His answer is that the Court's decisions are consistent with the Constitution's democratic
character because the people have come to accept (a) the Court as an appropriate institution to
protect individual rights and (b) the liberties articulated by the modem Court as the values we
hold. Id. See also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
67-70, 125-28 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 52 (1978); Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 226-27 (1980); Fiss,
The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38
(1979); Rostow, The Democratic Characterof JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. Rnv. 193 (1963).
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2
cases involving process rights and representation reinforcing values.
Third, the Court's decisions on all of these issues would bind the States.
Fourth, the Court's decisions, however, would not bind Congress except
when based on the largely process-oriented and representation reinforcing limits imposed directly on Congress by the Constitution.3 Fifth, to
insure that any congressional action modifying or reversing Court decisions on substantive rights and federalism issues addressed the merits,
the Court could use a variety of other techniques4 to examine the lawmaking process and to remand legislation to Congress for reconsideration when appropriate.
There is a common thread in these elements. The Court's decisions
interpreting the Constitution would not purport to be final and binding
determinations of substantive rights and federalism issues. They would
serve only to initiate a principled dialogue with Congress over the appropriate choices. For example, a decision of the Court invalidating a state
act for violating the Fourteenth Amendment on substantive grounds
would be subject to reversal or modification by Congress acting pursuant
to its enumerated powers. The Court would then review that legislative
response only to insure that Congress addressed the merits of the controversy in an open, representative manner, free of we-they defects in the
lawmaking process.5 Upon finding any such failure, the Court could suspend the federal statute and remand to Congress for further consideration, but Congress would retain ultimate authority to make the final
substantive policy choice. Throughout this Article, this alternative form
of judicial review is therefore referred to as "provisional review."
This alternative approach will be explored in three parts. Part I
examines the current legitimacy debate. Part II considers the constitu-

2. "Process rights" refer to procedural limits on governmental decisionmaking primarily
imposed by interpretations of the Due Process Clauses and related criminal procedure provisions. "Representation reinforcing values" refer to limits on official decisionmaking, elections,
and voting imposed by diverse interpretations of the Constitution that promote representative
democracy. In contrast, "substantive rights" refer to interpretations directly protecting personal rights (ag., privacy and autonomy) no matter how fair the processes that led to the
decisions affecting these interests. "Substantive due process" and "fundamental interest equal
protection" cases are prime examples of such substantive rights interpretations. See generally
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DImusTR

(1980). Finally, "federalism disputes" refer to contro-

versies concerning whether governmental decisionmaking power rests with the states or with
the federal government under the Constitution. See generally J. CHOPER, supra note 1.
3. See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 and amends. I-VIII (with the Due Process Clause in
amend. V understood solely as a procedural limit).
4. Examples of these techniques include statutory construction and suspensive veto.
5. "We-they defects" include, for example, legislation motivated by any racial bias of a
white majority in-group against a racial minority out-group. See J.ELY, supra note 2, at 13579.
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tional sources for judicial review of congressional power and federalism
disputes and of individual rights against both the states and the federal
government. Part II concludes by summarizing how the text and structure of the Constitution authorize, but do not compel, provisional review.
Part III evaluates the extent to which this alternative is consistent with
representative democracy and with our major judicial traditions. Part
III closes by evaluating the impact of provisional review on some of the
Court's major human rights decisions.
This Article is styled as an exploratory essay because my own views
are tentative. I am not convinced that provisional review should be
adopted by the Court or the people. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that
there is a mode of judicial review of substantive rights issues that is consistent with representative democracy. The existence of such an alternative may encourage the Court, commentators, Congress, and the people
to expend their energies discussing the merits of policy choices rather
than further debating the legitimacy of judicial review.
I.

The Legitimacy Debate

Contemporary theories of judicial review fall into three major
camps- interpretivist, structural, and noninterpretivist. Despite the exchange of sometimes heated criticism, the three share more in common
than their proponents care to admit.
A. Interpretivism
Interpretivists justify judicial review on the ground that the Court
finds and applies a superior positive law, ratified into the Constitution by
a prior supermajority, to strike down conflicting legislation subsequently
passed by a transitory majority. Yet, avowed interpretivists like Grano,
Bork, and Van Alstyne also claim that the general phrasing in clauses
like "equal protection" and "freedom of speech" authorize-but do not
compel-the modern Court's landmark decisions restraining
majoritarian legislation and practices concerning forced segregation and
abridgment of political speech.6 Grano, for example, approves of this
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause even if the Framers did not
specifically intend to outlaw school segregation. He argues that the general anti-caste value that he finds in "equal protection of the laws" need
not be negated even by the Framers' contrary original understanding
6. See generally Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971); Grano, JudicialReview and a Written Constitution in a DemocraticSociety, 28
WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1981); Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70
CALIF. L. REv. 107 (1982).
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concerning a specific practice unless the text itself provides for such a
specific exception. 7 Under this brand of interpretivism, the general value
underlying the constitutional provision prevails over current legislation.
Yet the Court, acting as a final arbiter in interpreting this general

value, does more than just "find" what the Framers enacted into positive
law. The Court makes a choice in defining the value protected by the

constitutional text and in measuring that protection against specific legislation or custom. While only one right answer may exist in every case
for a judge with the wisdom of Dworkin's Hercules, 8 a comparison of
Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education demonstrates that
the answer is not always dictated by the text or the Framers' intent.9 As
a result, the interpretivist premise is seriously undermined. Where the
7. Grano, supra note 6, at 67-73. Raoul Berger claims that the Court's authority to
exercise its power of judicial review is limited to those situations where the specific intent of
the Framers and, presumably, of the ratifiers unequivocally indicates that a particular type of
practice was specifically outlawed by adoption of a particular constitutional provision. See
generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). This approach is arguably consistent with the democratic notion that the Court may override ordinary legislation only if a
supermajority has previously enacted a higher positive law into the Constitution. Yet this
approach leads to a curiously undemocratic understanding of the Constitution: the dead hand
of the past limits the ability of the people's representatives to deal with the problems of today
and the needs of tomorrow through ordinary legislation.
To determine what the Framers intended to outlaw and what current practices are counterparts to such prohibited practices, we look through a lens that is focused by subsequent
history and often ask questions that history cannot answer. See, e.g., Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation,79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1036, 1039, 1064-68 (1981). The text of the Constitution and the Framers' intent do not always provide the specific answers that Berger purports to
find. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1961); J. ELY, supra note 2, at
11-43 (1980); Bork, supra note 6, at 13-15; Brest, supra note 1, at 214-17, 220-21, 230-31;
Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal
Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462
(1982); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); Sandalow, supra. Given
these interpretive dilemmas, two basic choices for judicial review emerge: either the Court can
limit its power to overturn decisions of representative institutions to those instances where the
text and Framers' intent clearly compel a specific answer, see, e.g., R. BERGER, supra, or the
Court can interpret more controversial, general and open-ended constitutional provisions in
reviewing majoritarian decisions. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra, and Wellington, Book Review, 97
HARV. L. REV. 326 (1983). If the Court chooses the first course, the general phrasing of many
constitutional provisions will be deprived of any judicially cognizable meaning. The Framers'
purpose in adopting general provisions rather than specific proscriptions will be ignored, and
the Court will be limited to posing unanswerable questions concerning the original understanding of the provisions. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra; Dimond, supra; Sandalow, supra. If the
Court chooses the second course, then the dilemma of an anti-majoritarian Court choosing to
overturn majoritarian decisions cannot be avoided. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 2, at 4-5, 41,
71. See generally A. BICKEL, supra; C. BLACK, DECISIONS ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
8. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1978).

9. Compare the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) with Justice
Harlan's dissent, 163 U.S. at 557-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
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constitutional text and Framers' intent are open-ended, the Court cannot
decide the merits of today's disputes solely by claiming to find an answer
from the past.
B. Structuralism
Faced with the necessity of judicial choice in interpreting the Constitution, Ely has suggested a supplementary, structural approach based
on the premise that majoritarian legislative decisions should generally
prevail over an anti-majoritarian Court in any democracy. Ely argues
that the Court should interpret only those constitutional values that reinforce the ability of legislative and executive institutions to represent fairly
the majority will.10 Under this interpretation, the Court acts as a final
arbiter of key constitutional provisions concerning due process, universal
suffrage, fair apportionment, and prohibition of we-they defects in the
legislative process to insure that representative institutions work. Yet,
this restriction on the Court's power to render decisions ignores many
other substantive provisions of the Constitution'1 and apparently prohibits the Court from making society confront any issue concerning substantive rights.

12

Choper takes a different structural approach. He urges the Court to
limit its final and binding interpretations to individual rights and to leave
federalism disputes for final resolution by Congress-the institution that
represents the interests of the people, the states, and the nation.3 While
there may be a strong case for the Court to defer to congressional deternuination of federalism issues, Choper fails to demonstrate why the Court
U.s. 483 (1954). See also Dimond, supra note 7, at 507-11; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,
34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 748 (1982).
10. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 73-180.
11. See, e.g., Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEx. L. RaV. 343 (1981). Whether or not one
agrees with each of Laycocek's suggestions for interpreting diverse substantive rights provisions
of the Constitution, it is manifest that Ely's representation reinforcing approach chooses to
eschew final and binding judicial interpretation of such substantive rights because it is inconsistent with his attempt to reconcile judicial review with representative democracy. See J. ELY,
supra note 2, at 41, 98.
12. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). I say
"apparently" because Ely does suggest, for example, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment may well offer an open-ended substantive rights provision. J.
ELY, supra note 2, at 28-30. Yet he does not see how judicial review of substance under such
an open-ended rights clause can be consistent with the democratic character of the Constitution. Id. at 41, 98. Therefore, Ely chooses to limit judicial interpretation to articulation and
enforcement of representation reinforcing values. The alternative approach explored here
seeks to meet Ely's objection by explaining how provisional review of substantive rights issues
is consistent with the tenets of representative democracy.
13. See J. CHOPER, supra note 1.
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should decline review of these issues altogether.14 Nor does he explain
how allowing the Court to be the final arbiter in all individual rights
cases is consistent with the democratic character of the Constitution.
Finally, Charles Black argues that, when interpreting the text and
structure of the Constitution, the Court has an important role in defining
and enforcing a wide range of substantive national rights. 5 To square
this daunting power with the tenets of representative democracy, however, Black argues that the Court's decisions are not final or binding because Congress may act under Article III to deprive the Court of
jurisdiction to hear any particular case.6 But this argument ignores the
limits imposed on all congressional powers by the Bill of Rights: is the
Court compelled to remain silent if Congress, for example, passes a law
barring the Court from reviewing free speech cases when the First
Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
freedom of speech"?
C.

Noninterpretivism

The self-styled noninterpretivists argue that the Framers did not
specifically intend to enact into positive law many of the modem Court's
major human rights decisions.17 As a result, some have argued that the
Court's "mission" to protect human rights must be justified on functional
rather than textual grounds. 8 Under this view, the Court is the deliberative forum of principle in which issues can be decided on the merits in a
14. The Court has demonstrated its capacity to defer to Congress for resolution of these
issues without finding them nonjusticiable under Article III. See, eg., infra text accompanying
notes 33-53. As a result, there is no need for the Court to give a restrictive reading to its
jurisdiction under Article III when federalism disputes arise in an actual case or controversy.
Moreover, the Court's decisions on the merits of disputes between states and Congress, even if
misdirected, are not as likely to drain any limited "judicial capital" as are the Court's restrictions on state discretion in its substantive rights and anti-discrimination rulings. Although
part II will not address Court decisions refereeing separation of power disputes between Congress and the President, these rulings probably have built rather than drained public support,
respect, and capital for the Court. See, eg., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3-30 (1976); M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 50-60. In addition, such
decisions usually do not establish substantive policies binding on all branches of government in
the future, but instead operate to remand the substantive policy choice for consideration by
some other branch or combination of branches. Modes of proceeding, not the merits of policy,
are thus dictated by judicial refereeing of separation of power disputes. See also infra note 88.
15. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969); C. BLACK, supra note 7.
16. C. BLACK, supra note 7, at 18-19.
17. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 65-72.
18. Id. at 93-96.
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search for "right" answers. 9
While some who engage in this search for fundamental values argue
that the Court's decisions are final and binding,20 Perry argues that Congress retains plenary power to restrict the Court's jurisdiction over
human rights cases. Yet, in Perry's view, this legislative power to constrain the Court's human rights decisions does not permit positive legislation that directly conflicts with the substance of the Court's decisions.
Ironically, Perry's "functional" argument posits moral dialogue as the
basis for judicial review but then deprives the people's representatives of
all opportunity and obligation to address directly the moral issues raised
by the Court's judgments. For Perry, moreover, unfettered congressional
power to gerrymander the Court's jurisdiction is but a grudging concession to majority rule; he hopes that a variety of institutional constraints
will prevent Congress from ever exercising this plenary power to silence
2
the Court. '
Perry never argues that his functional human rights approach to
judicial review runs contrary to the text of the Constitution. In his most
recent reconsideration of this issue, he even drops the argument that the
major human rights decisions of the modem Court are "extra-constitutional." Instead, he substitutes an argument that sounds familiar to
many interpretivists. He admits that the Court does interpret the text of
the Constitution when engaging in judicial review, but, as in the case of
the critic encountering a literary classic, this search for meaning is not
limited to investigating the author's original intent.2 2
Van Alstyne's interpretivist criticism 2 of Perry's earlier rhetoric as
inventing a new constitution in his personal image clouds the common
problem shared by interpretivist and noninterpretivist alike: open-ended
19. Id. at 101-27. At the very least, the Court initiates some sort of principled dialogue
over the substance of rights. Id. at 93, 98, 112; L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 13-14, 892.
20. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 896; Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the FederalCourts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981).
21. See M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 128-37.
22. See Perry, A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation (forthcoming article). Perry amplifies his claim that constitutional interpretation partakes of a religious encounter with a sacred document. Perry's latest labels, nevertheless, continue his attempt to place all
interpretivists into Berger's isolated camp by limiting them exclusively to a search for "authorial meaning" or "originalist interpretation"-e., the specific intent of the Framers or ratifiers. In defining that meaning, Perry continues to find that almost nothing was originally
intended, and he ascribes only the narrowest plausible conception to generally phrased provisions of the Constitution that might otherwise limit governmental power. Most self-styled
defenders of interpretivism, however, have rejected this gambit and refuse to be placed in such
a narrow corner. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text.
23. Van Alstyne, Interpreting this Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributionsof Special
Theories of JudicialReview, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1983).
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constitutional provisions authorize a range of choices but do not compel
any particular choice. The Court must often do more than find a particular positive law specifically enacted by a previous supermajority. But
how can this discretionary role of the Court square with majority rule in
our representative democracy? It is no answer for interpretivists to ridicule Perry's early rhetoric when they share the same problem.24
D.

Nonfinal Judicial Review
In response to this dilemma of judicial choice, Wellington and

Sandalow counsel that we have not paid enough attention to the possibility that the Court's constitutional interpretations need not be final or
binding. After all, constitutional amendments have overruled certain
Court decisions,2 5 while others have been substantially eroded or undercut by subsequent judicial decisions and congressional legislation.26
From this perspective, the Court's decisions interpreting the Constitution
may be viewed as provisional judgments ultimately subject to reversal

through an ongoing process akin to common law adjudication without
24. Thus, Van Alstyne argues that the history of the Equal Protectionand Free Speech
Clauses authorize but do not compel the Court's decisions concerning reapportionment and
free speech. See generally Van Alstyne, The FourteenthAmendment, the "Right" to Vote, and
the Understandingof the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 33; Van Alstyne, supra
note 6. In both instances, Van Alstyne recognizes that the Court exercises choice in making a
judgment rather than being given a single answer by the Framers; he also recognizes the difficulties that this stubborn reality of constitutional interpretation presents to conscientious
judges, as well as the dilemma that it poses for judicial review in a constitutional democracy.
Once Perry's rhetoric is pierced, Van Alstyne and Perry face the same practical and theoretical
problems with judicial interpretation of the Constitution. See generally Sandalow, supra note
7. In the process of elaborating provisional review, this Article may contribute to moving
beyond the contentious labels and obfuscating terms clouding the current legitimacy debate.
Tribe offers another way to minimize the central problem of the legitimacy debate. He
notes the majoritarian constraints on the Court, the less than ideally democratic operations of
our representative institutions in practice, and the dialogue between the various constitutional
actors over the correct interpretation of an indeterminate constitutional text. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 9-14, 49-52. Although such observations are bracing, they do not often help in
making choices among plausible interpretations of the Constitution. Part II, infra, therefore
examines the issues of judicial review by turning to interpretation of the Constitution itself.
25. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (overruling Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (overruling Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857)); U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI (overruling Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970)).
26. Compare, eg., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896); compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) with Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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stare decisis27 or by simple statute if Congress can ever muster the neces-

sary majority. 28 This vision of the Court as initiator of a dialogue about
the meaning of the Constitution certainly makes judicial review more
consistent with the traditional theory of democracy.
There remains the disturbing prospect that a blanket rejection of the
binding nature of judicial interpretation of any constitutional provision
conflicts with specific provisions of the text. For example, judicial interpretation of Article I, section 9 and of the Bill of Rights may limit congressional power by imposing constraints on majority rule. Part II,
therefore, analyzes several types of constitutional cases to determine
whether an alternative form of judicial review better fits the text and
structure of the Constitution. Part II also offers a principled basis for
determining what types of cases should be subject to congressional reversal and what types of cases should be subject to reversal only by constitu-

tional amendment or subsequent judicial decision.
HI.

Forms of Judicial Interpretation

Part II examines judicial interpretations of the meaning of the Constitution with respect to (a) the limits of congressional power and resolution of federalism disputes, (b) individual rights against the states, and (c)
individual rights against the national government. Part II does not contend that the Court has been compelled to adopt or to apply particular
interpretations of the Constitution. Nor does it explain instances where
the Court, in choosing among alternative interpretations, made right or
wrong choices. Rather, the objective is to determine whether the Court's
prior decisions offer any options for an alternative form ofjudicial review
that better fits the democratic character of the Constitution.
A.

Congressional Power and Federalism Disputes
Chief Justice John Marshall's opinions for the Court in McCulloch

27. Wellington, supra note 7; Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J.
486 (1982); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. Rnv. 1162 (1977).
In his published articles, Dean Sandalow has only sketched his support for the view that the
Court's constitutional decisions ultimately should be subject to direct reversal by the Congress
through ordinary statutes. In comparison, provisional review would allow the Supreme Court
to shift final decision on most fundamental values, as well as disputes arising from the Union's
federal structure, from the states to Congress. This shift reflects Sandalow's early suggestion
that state court review could limit the otherwise broad initiative powers oflocal government by
shifting final decisions on such critical issues to the state legislature. See Sandalow, supra, at
1187-90; Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power UnderHome Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 700-09 (1964).
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v. Maryland2 9 and Gibbons v. Ogden3 ° established a basic framework for
judicial review of congressional power. Congress acts within its power if
(1)the goal of the law is related to one or more of the enumerated powers
and the implied powers arising therefrom; (2) appropriate means are chosen to achieve that legitimate end; and (3) neither the means nor the ends
of the law are prohibited by other provisions of the Constitution. 31 The
first two constraints can be understood as "internal limits" inferred from
the enumerated grants of power to Congress. The last can be understood
as external limits imposed, for example, by the provisions of Article 1,
section 9 or of the Bill of Rights on all enumerated congressional
powers.32
In practice, the modern Court has deferred to the legislative branch
and imposed virtually no internal limits upon Congress. 33 Both McCul29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
31. In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall described this test variously as follows:
-- "The [federal] government which has a right to do an act [under the Constitution]...
must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means ....
17 U.S. at
409-10.
-- "[L]eave it in the power of Congress to adopt any [means] which might be appropriate,
and which were conducive to the end [enumerated in the Constitution]." Id. at 415.
-Congress may "employ those [means] which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the object [enumerated in the Constitution] to be accomplished. . . any means
adapted to the end." Id. at 419.
-- "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421.
-- "[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects
entrusted to the government, to undertake [in the Court] to inquire into the degree of its
necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread
on legislative ground." Id. at 423.
32. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 224-27, for a detailed elaboration of the distinction
between internal and external limits.
33. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 224, 236-42, 250, 273. Thus, for example, in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), the Court articulated the
test as follows:
--"whether the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which concerns more than
one state' [citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1]." 379 U.S. at 254.
-"whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that [activities sought to be regulated] affected commerce." Id. at 258.
-- "if [Congress] had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that [perceived] evil are reasonable and appropriate [including, for example, total prohibition.]" Id.
In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964), the Court added, "where we
find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis
for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation [of any internal limits on the exercise of enumerated powers] is at an end."
Occasionally, however, the Court has remanded to Congress for a "clear statement" that
Congress does intend to exercise its resulting plenary power in full. See L. TIBE, supra note
1, at 243-44; Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Fitzpat-
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loch and Gibbons recognized that such an approach trusts Congress to
resolve the issue of which governmental power should be exercised by the
national government, the state governments, or both. The structure of
the Constitution, in which Congress represents the interests of both the
people and the states in maintaining a federal system, may be interpreted
as giving Congress the institutional capacity and the primary responsibility to resolve federalism issues.3 4
By the same token, McCulloch and subsequent cases recognized that

the Constitution did not provide the same institutional basis for trusting
a state when it acted against federal instrumentalities and nonresidents,
or when it imposed burdens on interstate commerce or the national economy. 35 Whether the Court initially treats such state actions as constiturick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672, 674 (1974);
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. at 430-32; J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 176-92; Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of
Federalism, 54 COLUM. L. Rlv. 543 (1961). My point is not that the Constitution compels
this reading. There are plausible alternative interpretations to read the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a sharp restriction on any implied powers emanating from the enumerated powers.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 412-14; L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 228. Even within his
rulings, Marshall left open the possibility that the Constitution might impose federalism limits
on congressional power based "on a fair construction of the whole instrument." McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. at 406. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 195, Marshall noted:
The genius and character of the whole [federal] government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely
within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necesssary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
[federal] government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be
considered as reserved for the State itself.
Nevertheless, Marshall made the choice that the Court should generally defer to Congress on
such issues of federal versus state authority because "[i]n the legislature of the Union alone, are
[the people of the States] all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be
trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 431. Marshall added,
"[tihe people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by
their representatives, exercise [the enumerated federal] power" to regulate the States themselves or their constituents. Id. at 433.
35. Thus, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 435-36, Marshall struck down Maryland's tax on the National Bank because the interests of the federal government were not
represented in the legislature of the state. See also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662 (1981); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868); C. BLACK, supra note 15, at 22-32
(discussing decisions striking down state imposition of burdens on federal officers and state
interference with federal rights). Beginning in 1871 with Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, the
Court chose to distort Marshall's structural understanding of the relation between the federal
and state governments by adopting a concept of "dual sovereignty" to immunize the salaries of
state officials from nondiscriminatory federal taxes applicable to the wages of others. This
perverse view of state sovereignty to limit the federal taxing power was pursued with vengeance in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), to limit the power of Congress to
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tional violations of personal rights and national prerogatives or merely as
common law federalism disputes,36 the Court's subsequent review of congressional acts reversing, modifying, or altering its initial resolution
should proceed pursuant to the deferential standard appropriate for de37
termining whether the act exceeds the scope of congressional power.
For example, in McCulloch, the Court hinted that Congress would
have the power to authorize Maryland to tax the national bank-even on
a discriminatory basis.38 Subsequent decisions recognized that Congress
may authorize the states to burden interstate commerce even after the
Court has held that a state may not do so on its own. 39 As long as the

congressional act authorizing state discrimination does not run afoul of
any external limit imposed on congressional powers by other provisions
of the Constitution, the Court need not choose to impose its own artifi-

cial internal limits by restrictively interpreting Congress' enumerated
powers. With respect to internal limits, the Court uses deferential standards for reviewing any act of Congress passed pursuant to an enumerated power.' That fact should come as no surprise: the structure of the

Constitution places primary responsibility for ultimate resolution of
these federalism tensions with Congress, the representative institution
that can respond to the will of the people concerning the respective roles
of the states and the national government. 4 '
regulate commerce. See infra note 51. Such judicially imposed limits on the enumerated powers of Congress in the name of "state sovereignty" finally fell in Graves ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939) (no state immunity from federal tax) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (no state sovereignty limit on congressional exercise of enumerated power). See also
infra note 46 and accompanying text.
36. See, eg., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-80 (1945); C. BLACK, supra note 15; J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at
205-09; L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 319-408; Dowling, InterstateCommerce and State Power, 27
VA. L. REV. 1 (1940); Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. Rnv. 1 (1975); Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clauseas a Limit
on State Regulation, 32 WAYNE L. Rav. (forthcoming article 1985).
37. See, eg., supra note 36; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. at 769; Western & S.
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). Compare Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1852) with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co, 59 U.S. 421 (1855); compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) with In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 420-22.
39. See supra notes 36, 37.
40. See supra note 33.
41. Under this analysis, if the right to travel is viewed solely as an incident to the federal
structure of the Constitution necessary to prevent any state from discriminating against nonresidents, Congress would have the power to reach different results than the Court by enacting
legislation under its commerce, spending, or civil rights enforcement powers, as long as the act
did not run afoul of the external limits imposed on all congressional power. Cf. Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 150 (1970) (opinion of Douglas, J.) (plenary congressional power to
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From this perspective, a decision like National League of Cities v.

Usery,42 which makes the Court's judgment on the appropriate division
of responsibility between federal and state governments final and binding

on subsequent congressional resolutions, is unjustified. Nevertheless,
some argue that in such cases the Court appropriately engages in the
stronger, "final arbiter" mode of judicial review by measuring the congressional act against an "external limit" inferred from the structure of
the Constitution. In NationalLeague of Cities, this external limit was the
"guts of state sovereignty under our federalism."' 3 Yet this external
limit is also the same internal limit which McCulloch counseled is better
decided by Congress on a continuing basis than by the Court once and
enforce right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 630-31 (1969); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). On the other hand, if the right to travel is viewed as a personal right
essential as a safety valve to permit escape from hostile local majorities, see J. ELY, supra note
2, at 177-79, congressional power to reverse or to modify judicial interpretations of that right
may well turn on whether the right is viewed as an external limit inferred from the structure of
the Constitution as a whole and binding on Congress or a privilege or immunity under section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment binding only on the states. See infra part IIB and IIC.
42. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). [Editor's note: While this Article was at the printer, the Court directly
overruled NationalLeague of Cities. Garcia adopts a rationale that trusts congressional resolution of federalism disputes. Although Professor Dimond proposes a slightly different elaboration, his proposal is consistent with traditional deferential approaches to judicial review of
congressional power in cases of federal-state tension.].
43. See, e.g., L. TRINE, supra note 1,at 301-02. Tribe does not support Justice Rehnquist's wooden argument that minimum wage and maximum hour provisions for public employees impermissibly intrude on state sovereignty. Id. at 309-12. Instead, he argues that the
result is justified by concern for individual rights against the states. Id. at 313-18. But Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion is concerned with state discretion to do as it pleases rather than
state duties to provide services to persons. Thus, Tribe's alternative rationale to support the
decision seems only wishful thinking. If the real concern is individual substantive rights and
state duties, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides more relevant interpretive
choices than "our federalism" and "the guts of State sovereignty."
Justice Rehnquist's choice to impose an external federalism limit on congressional commerce power is not, however, foreclosed by the Constitution. Even McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. at 404-07, recognized that such an interpretation was plausible. But neither is that
choice compelled. For the reasons articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, see
supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text, and reiterated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857-62, and by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248-49 (1983), deference to Congress on federalism issues is
the better choice, unless Congress acts to destroy some or all states.
Even in that unlikely event, the choice for the Court will not be compelled. When Congress acted in 1867 to substitute United States military districts for civilian government in the
rebel states, extraordinary circumstances supported the suspension of state sovereignty, and
with an assist from Congress, the Court found a way to avoid reviewing the constitutionality of
the Military Reconstruction Act. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868). Given the
system of congressional representation now provided in the Constitution, however, it is difficult to imagine that Congress would actually act to abolish or suspend any states absent another War between the States.

214

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 12:201

for all. Indeed, the Court often cited that limit to justify its imposition of
definitional restrictions on congressional commerce power during the era
of Hammer v. Dagenhart.4 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.45
signalled the Court's practical rejection of this approach, and in United
States v. Darby4 6 the Court explicitly returned to the traditional doctrine
of McCulloch, by embracing the proposition that the structure of the
Constitution gives Congress continuing power to resolve federalism disputes by legislation.
47
The Court's decisions after National League of Cities-Hodel,
4
8
4
9
5
Long Island Railroad, FERC, and EEOC v. Wyoming -- all upheld
congressional power in the face of state claims of interference with state
sovereignty. These decisions form an analogy to the Court's earlier decisions starting with Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." Once again the Court
44. 247 U.S. 251, 273-75 (1918). The Court wrote:
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the states in
their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture. . . . [The Nation is made up of states to which are entrusted the powers of local government. And
to them and to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the National Goverment are reserved.
Id. at 273-74. To this statement Holmes retorted in dissent:
I should have thought that the most conspicuous decisions of this Court had made it
clear that the power to regulate commerce and other [enumerated congressional]
powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the
carrying out of the domestic policy of any State.. . . Under the Constitution such
commerce belongs not to the States but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its
views of activities of the States.
Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also infra note 51.
46. 312 U.S. 100, 115, 123 (1941). The Court directly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart
and held: "[R]egulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition
are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. . . . Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment [which] . . . states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered." Cf.Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Stern,
The Commerce Clause and the NationalEconomy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946);
Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.A. J. 823 (1955) ("cumulative
effect" standard leading to same result as deferential review under McCulloch and Gibbons).
47. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that federal regulation of private mining operations did not violate state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment).
48. Union Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (upholding federal
regulation of a state owned and operated railroad).
49. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding
federal mandate compelling state utility agencies to consider federal proposals for rate designs
and other regulations).
50. 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act extends to state employees).
51. This decision represented a turning point in the Court's analysis of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. Before Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court had ruled that
industrial labor practices were too indirectly related to interstate commerce to justify congres-
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can be seen as working out of another aberrational bout with final judicial resolution of federalism disputes. Although the course set by these
decisions may still appear definitional at *this point,52 the path back to
Chief Justice Marshall's basic interpretation of the Constitution is now in

sight.
It is not a big step from EEOC v. Wyoming to a standard of judicial
review that treats the "external limit" of "our Federalism" much the
same as the "internal limit" of "state sovereignty." Did Congress, acting
pursuant to its enumerated powers, have a rational basis for deciding that
the national interest outweighs the state interest? If so, did Congress
choose an appropriate means to implement its judgment? If the Court
believes something more is required to insure that Congress actually considers state interests, it can demand a clear statement from Congress that
the legislature directly addressed these two questions in its decisionmak53
ing process.
B.

Individual Rights Against the States

Several provisions in the Constitution directly protect individual
rights against state infringement,54 and inferences from the structure of
sional regulation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (striking down federal statute regulating the wages and hours of mine workers because
labor relations were said to have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 251 (striking down federal act that excluded products of child labor
from interstate commerce because the law invaded local police powers).
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court upheld a decision of the NLRB to reinstate an
employee who had been discharged for union activity. The Court emphasized the "far-flung"
activities of the steel industry and the substantial effect labor strife would have on interstate
commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41. The Court made no effort to distinguish
Carter even though the link between labor relations and interstate commerce was far more
attenuated in Jones & Laughlin Steel than it was in Carter. See Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, supra note 46, at 681-82.
52. For example, either the particular act does not impinge on traditional attributes of
state sovereignty, or it uses means designed to insure cooperative federalism rather than destroying state sovereignty.
53. Even the Burger Court's most active defenders ofjudicial intervention to protect state
discretion and state immunity from federal regulation recognize that Congress generally possesses the ultimate power to resolve other federalism tensions. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Whether the Court should impose
a "clear statement rule" in such cases to insure that Congress has weighed the state interests is
debatable. After all, the Court's claim of protecting state sovereignty in Hammerv. Dagenhart
coincided with its decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which also deprived
states of the discretion to regulate the economy, albeit in the guise of securing personal liberty
interests. Perhaps Rehnquist's federalism opinions have a similar substantive policy motivation. See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976); Fiss &
Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14.

54. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, and amends.XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI.
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the Constitution may provide additional sources of protection." For
purposes of this inquiry, however, only section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be considered. The amendment imposes three duties
directly on the states: "No State shall" (1) "make or enforce any law"
abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States";
(2) "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law"; nor (3) "deny 5 to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
6
laws."
the
of
protection
On their face, the three clauses can be read as providing respectively
for (1) individual substantive rights, (2) procedural fairness in any action
by the state depriving persons of life, liberty, or property, and (3) some
kind of anti-caste or anti-discrimination protection in official decisionmaking processes. The text, however, does not define "privileges or immunities." Thus, that clause can be read as a general protection of
unenumerated substantive rights.57
If this reading of section 1 is correct, it does not foreclose many
choices for the Court when interpreting individual rights against the
states or reciprocal state duties. Among the few choices foreclosed, however, is that of substituting the Due Process Clause for the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as the primary substantive rights provision. Nevertheless, "due process of law" may have had some substantive connotation at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.5" The
Framers also conversed with sufficient generality to permit such a substantive reading of due process.59 Given the clear availability of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the primary source of substantive rights,
the Due Process Clause can nevertheless be read as a procedural protection in the context of all three clauses." °
55. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 2; C. BLACK, supra note 15.
56. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
57. My own review of the congressional debates concerning the framing and enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment confirms that this reading of section 1 is plausible and is certainly a better alternative than finding that the Framers unequivocally agreed on a specific
meaning contrary to the text of section 1 itself. See Dimond, supra note 7. See also, J. ELY,
supra note 2, at 22-32, 192-202. See generally H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908).
58. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMiSAR &
J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 425-27 (1981).
59. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1951) (republished as EQUAL UNDER THE LAW (1965)); Dimond, supra note 7,
at 483-92; Graham, The EarlyAntislavery Backgrounds of the FourteenthAmendment, I Genesis, 1833-1835, 1950 Wis. L. Rlv. 479; Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the
FourteenthAmendment, H Systemization, 1835-1837, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 610.
60. Cf. Dimond, supra note 7, at 465-72 (clauses in section 1 should not be read as code
words having precise meanings for the Framers different from the text and structure). Limit-
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Unlike the other two clauses, the Due Process Clause is limited to
state deprivation of "life, liberty, or property." Although that distinction

may not compel much restriction on the scope of the procedural guarantee, it does provide a textual basis for imposing some limits. In contrast,
the text does not limit the scope of "privileges or immunities" or "equal
protection of the laws."6 1 Thus, the restrictive reading of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause announced in the Slalighter-House Cases62 was not
dictated by the text. Limited to its facts, that holding stands for nothing
more than a judicial choice to deny that carrying on a trade constituted a
fundamental personal right in 1873.63 The Slaughter-House Cases should

not foreclose judicial intepretation of fundamental personal rights under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Instead, it should be viewed as one
decision on one issue at one time.
The Court's subsequent choice in Lochner to give a different substantive reading to the Due Process Clause should not obscure the fact
that the Court in both cases defined what it deemed to be fundamental
personal rights. As a result, all subsequent substantive due process decisions could have been decided by defining what did or did not constitute
ing due process protection to procedure does not imply that any particular form or timing of
procedure is dictated when the Court determines that a state has deprived any person of "life,
liberty, or property." See eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 1,at 532-63. Nor does it mean that purely
procedural protections never operate to serve substantive ends. See generally C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974); Dimond, The
ConstitutionalRight to Education, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973). The Due Process Clause
can also include a strong procedural component in reviewing the process of lawmaking. See
infra notes 68-78, 98-101 and accompanying text.
61. See Dimond, supra note 7, at 467. By its terms, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
provides for rights "of citizens of the United States." Ely nevertheless argues that the phrasing
can also describe a category of national rights that the states may not abridge, whether the
victim is a citizen or an alien. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 25. An alternative approach, which
may be responsive to the real differences between citizens and aliens, interprets the clause as
applying only to citizens, but uses two other sources to protect aliens. First, the Court examines the process by which a state distinguishes between citizens and aliens under the Equal
Protection Clause to determine if naked prejudice-rather than relevant differences between
citizens and aliens-influenced the decision. See infra text at notes 69-78, 98-101. Second, if
the Court finds prejudice, it suspends the state's classification against aliens until Congress acts
pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 4, to impose the same condition, authorize the states to
pass such a regulation, or establish other conditions for aliens. See supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
62. 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (upholding a Louisiana statute that granted one company a monopoly to operate stock yards and slaughterhouses in New Orleans despite claims that the statute
violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
63. That choice resembles the one made by the modern Court when it rejected Lochner's
contrary holding, under the rubric of "due process." See, ag., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (discussed supra note 46); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state regulation of women's wages); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding minimum price for milk set by state milk control board).
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national privileges or immunities.'
Whether pursued under the Privileges or Immunities Clause or substantive due process, judicial review of substantive rights searches for ideals rooted in the nation's evolving conscience-ideals necessary to
resolve basic moral questions about the rights of individuals against
states." Such judicial interpretation also initiates an ongoing dialogue
with the people, their representatives, and the courts.66 Over time, the
Court may modify or reject its previous answers in response to the demands of the people, changed circumstances, or new understanding.6 7
Interpretation of substantive rights under the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause supports the framework
for provisional review. Under this approach, judicial interpretation of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause binds the states, but it does not restrict congressional power. In the exercise of its enumerated powers,
Congress can respond directly to Court interpretations of privileges or
immunities by ordinary legislation unless such action is barred by an external limit on congressional power. There is, however, no Privileges or
Immunities Clause in the Constitution that operates as such an external
limit on congressional power.6 8
This interpretation of section 1 limits the primary function of equal
protection to a procedural inquiry into state failure to afford protection
from caste discrimination or other invidious preferences in official decisionmaking.69 Undoubtedly such an interpretation involves important
64. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia, 291 U.S. at
502; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
65. In each case, the Court would ask whether the claimed right is a national privilege or
immunity. If the answer is no, the Court would merely elaborate its substantive reasoning. If
the answer is yes, the Court would have to articulate its reasons for declaring such a right and
then weigh the state's interests in abridging that right against the personal interest in enjoyment of that right. The merits of each determination would be the crucial factor under such a
review, whether undertaken in the guise of the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This adjudicatory process offers institutional constraints that limit the Court's
discretion and focus the Court's attention on the substance of the rights at issue. See, eg.,
Dworkin, supra note 12; Fiss, supra note 1; Sandalow, supra note 7; Tribe, supra note 12;
Wellington, supra notes 7, 27.
66. See M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 93-113; L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 892-93; Wellington,
supra note 27. CompareLochner, 198 U.S. 45, with Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502; compare Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1; compare
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); compare Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Wellington, supra note 27.
68. See infra part IIC.
69. For diverse elaborations of this interpretation of equal protection, see J. ELY, supra
note 2; Brest, In Defense of the Anti-DiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976);
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judgments.7"

Nevertheless, the judicial inquiry does not focus on
value
the justification for material inequalities and disproportionate outcomes
between groups. Rather, it looks for we-they preferences in the decisionmaking process, as well as the stigmatizing consequences that accompany such caste distinctions.7 1 This procedural inquiry eschews use of
"strict scrutiny" to balance the interests of discrete and insular minorities
against the state's interest in a particular legislative classification. Instead, the inquiry centers on whether the legislature, in its lawmaking
process, has singled out members of some group as inherently undeserving of personal respect and concern regardless of their individual
worth.72
Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle,30 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1983); Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution (forthcoming article). Whether this approach to equal protection review
also requires that legislation be general rather than special is an open question. See Yudof &
Kirp, A Revisionist View of Equal Protection (forthcoming article). The extent to which rational relationship review under either equal protection or its due process twin plays a role in
the proposed alternative framework is discussed infra at notes 75-78, 82, 139-40 and accompanying text. The modern Court has virtually eschewed any role for such rational relationship
review. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (due process) with New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (equal protection).
Insofar as the Court's "heightened scrutiny" under the "fundamental interest" prong of
two-tier equal protection analysis concerns substantive rights, see, eg., Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969), such cases
would be decided by invoking the Privileges or Immunities Clause under the alternative framework. Some fundamental interest decisions, however, may involve issues of procedural fairness or unjustified we-they preferences in the decisionmaking process that should be addressed
under due process or equal protection. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Such analytic rigor might aid the reasoning and the results of
the Court's decisions. Moreover, when substantive rights rather than procedural issues are at
stake, interpretation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause would give the Court a broader
authorization to initiate a principled dialogue about such issues as rights to self-actualizing
expression and creativity, personal autonomy and privacy, and minimum protection.
70. See Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 446 (1981).
71. See, eg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 & n.ll (1967); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880). See also Brest,
supra note 69; Dimond, supra note 69.
72. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 216-19 (1944) (Black, J., opinion
for the Court) (weighing public necessity of particular war power action against "suspect classification" of Japanese-Americans) with 323 U.S. at 223-24 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (examining racial defects in the decisionmaking process that led to racial classification against Japanese
Americans). See also Dimond, supra note 69, at 8 n.19.
Principled application of this search for invidious we-they distinctions underlies Supreme
Court decisions striking down grossly unrepresentative legislative apportionment schemes.
See, eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Decisions striking down various qualifications on the right to vote may also emerge from a desire to
remove bias from our representative legislative bodies. See, eg., Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See
generally J. ELY, supra note 2. In the context of provisional review, most voting cases may
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Although this judicial search for bias in state decisionmaking
processes necessarily involves exploration of all relevant evidence, including the foreseeable impact of the act and the substantive reasons behind
the legislature's particular classification, the wrong relates primarily to
the process of decisionmaking and not to the material outcomes or substantive inequalities flowing from the particular act. Upon review of several cases revealing similar patterns of prejudice, the Court may begin to
develop prophylactic rules of thumb and presumptions to infer invidious
purpose from disparate effects.7 3 But the central wrong still74relates to the
class- or caste-based defect in the decisionmaking process.
This process-oriented interpretation also offers an interesting nonconstitutional approach to understanding rational basis review "with
teeth." Consider Justice Brennan's dissent in United States RailroadRetirementBoard v. Fritz.75 Brennan pointed out that the statutory classification divested railroad retirees of earned benefits. The express purpose
of the Railroad Retirement Act, however, was to preserve "vested earned
benefits of retirees." Thus, Brennan argued that the classification was
"not only rationally unrelated to the Constitutional purpose; it [was] inimical to it."'76 Due to this blatant conflict between the law's provisions
and its stated purpose, Brennan refused to accept the government's post
hoc justificatiop1 for the classification. He argued that rational basis review requires the Court to examine the objectives of the statute and determine whether the challenged classification furthers these objectives.
In similar circumstances, the Court often uses a means-end analysis
as one aid in determining whether an invidious purpose or naked preference has skewed the official decisiomaking process. 77 Under a processalso be understood as a component or precondition of the due process of lawmaking. In any
event, the Court intended these decisions to end the hegemony of vested interests that control
legislative decisionmaking.
73. See, ag., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
74. See supra note 69. No reader, however, should mistake this description of equal protection as approving the Burger Court's articulations and applications of an "intent" standard;
nor should any reader assume that this interpretation offers little power to expose and root out
the most entrenched forms of caste discrimination. See Dimond, supra note 69.
75. 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the case is decided under
rational relation review under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the challenged legislation is a congressional act, the analysis is the same under rational relation review
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See also
supra note 69.
76. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 186 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. This analysis should be viewed as one aspect of the sensitive judicial inquiry for a
caste-based defect in the legislative decisionmaking process, not as a different standard of equal
protection review of "suspect classifications." See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 136-41, 145-48, 246
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oriented interpretation, however, the Court need not tie Congress' hands
by reaching a final judgment on this difficult inquiry. Rather, the Court
could first impose a "suspensive veto."7 8 Without deciding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court could remand the statute to the legislature to reconsider its classification. The legislature could either explain
how the classification meets the stated goals or develop a new classification altogether.7 9 This nonconstitutional mode of Supreme Court review
of legislative action may be useful in structuring a principled dialogue
between the Court and legislatures over the substance of constitutional
rights, the nature of constitutional violations, and the form and scope of
effective remedies.
The diverse judicial interpretations of the three section 1 clauses
raise the question of the respective roles of the Court and Congress under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress power to "enforce" individual rights against state action."0 Do the text and structure of the Fourteenth Amendment impose
any "internal limits" on congressional enforcement power under section
5? The text provides the Court with several plausible choices for imposing such limits. Congress may "enforce" but not "dilute" or "reverse"
rights defined by judicial interpretation of section 1; it may "enforce" but
not "define" additional rights not yet interpreted by the Court under section 1; it has broad power to "remedy" proven or declared state defaults
in failing to carry out duties under section 1, but no authority to anticipate such defaults or to legislate directly to protect individual rights.
Each of these "internal limits" can be distilled from the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Yet section 5 is an affirmative grant of power to Congress. The
Court's opinions that recognize substantial internal limits on Congress'
enforcement power under section 5 strain hard to find a principled rationale for the limits. This search is reminiscent of the Court's unsuccesssful definitional approach used to impose internal limits on the
n.45; Dimond, supra note 69, at 8 n.19; Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. Cr.REv.127, 130-31.
78. Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities, supra note 28, at 1187-90; Sandalow, The
Limits ofMunicipal Power UnderHome Rule." A Role for the Courts,supra note 28, at 702-09.
79. A more difficult constitutional dilemma arises if the legislature merely re-enacts the
law without change or explanation upon this remand. Whether the Court should then choose
to strike down the act as arbitrary or irrational if no invidious influence can be found in the
legislative process comes close to mimicking the parable with which Ely ends his book. See J.
ELY, supra note 2, at 181-83.
80. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.
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commerce power during the Dagenhartera. 8 The Court may therefore
choose to use a more deferential standard to review internal limits on
congressional enforcement power under section 5: did Congress have a
rational basis for finding it was "enforcing" a right under section 1? If
so, did Congress use appropriate means to accomplish this legitimate
end? If the Court chose this interpretation, section 5 would not impose
any artificial internal limits on this particular congressional enforcement
power.82
Whether the Court should adopt this approach when interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment depends, in part, on the nature of its impacts4
83
on prior decisions like the Civil Rights Cases, Katzenbach v. Morgan
Roe v. Wade,8 5 and Brown v. Board of Education.8 6 That impact cannot
81. Note the similarity of the diverse opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), to the majority's rationale in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Justice Holmes'
dissent in Hammer undercuts the viability of invoking any definitional approaches to inferring
artificial internal limits on the grant of any congressional power. See also L. TRIBE, supra note
1, at 261-72.
82. Nevertheless, the Court could give substantial nonconstitutional teeth to review of
legislation that Congress purports to pass pursuant to its section 5 enforcement power. Consider the following hypothetical: In a case challenging segregation of schools and housing
throughout a metropolitan area, the Supreme Court holds that a state-condoned caste system
of racial ghettoization denies equal protection to all persons in the community and is a substantial cause of the continuing racial separation. The Court therefore affirms an order directing the state (a) to desegregate its schools in the area and (b) to implement a program of
voluntary incentives to begin to transform the dual housing system. Based on its own hearings, Congress responds by passing the Equal Opportunity Act. It finds that such systems of
unconstitutional segregation exist throughout the country and must be dismantled, but bars
any pupil reassignments to accomplish desegregation, bars any housing desegregation incentives, and provides only compensatory aid to ghetto schools. In reviewing the Act, the Court
could respond with a suspensive veto remanding to Congress for reconsideration because the
Act's substantive provisions do not fit its articulated findings and purpose. See supra notes 6972 and accompanying text.
Suppose Congress then responded with the same findings and articulated purpose, but
provided substantial support for majority-to-minority pupil transfers, new integrated learning
centers open to all in the affected areas, incentives for integrative housing choices, as well as
compensatory aid to minority victims of caste segregation. The Court would be more likely to
find that the means chosen fit the articulated purposes. See Dimond, supra note 69. On the
other hand, if Congress responded to the remand by passing the original substantive provisions
of the Act and declaring that racial separation in every metropolitan area resulted from voluntary choice and nondiscriminatory ethnic clustering, the Court would then be faced with the
sensitive task of reviewing whether the lawmaking process was tainted by racial discrimination
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, an external limit that binds all congressional power. See infra notes 98-101, 147-49 and accompanying text.
83. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the congressional enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not authorize the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
84. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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be gauged until we consider the external limits on all congressional
power. Does either the means or the end of an act passed pursuant to
Congress' section 5 enforcement power run afoul of other provisions of
the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights?8 7
C. Individual Rights Against the National Government
Article I, section 9, and the Bill of Rights impose the primary external limits on Congress when legislating pursuant to enumerated powers.88 This inquiry, however, addresses only provisions in the Bill of
Rights that are relevant to determining which judicial interpretations of
87. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 272 & n.61; Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret
Due Process and EqualProtection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975) (similar analysis of plenary
congressional enforcement power, subject to external limits of Bill of Rights, but interpreting
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a substantive limit on Congress coextensive with
limits imposed by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the states). Internal limits on
congressional power to enforce section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are plausible, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651-52 n.10, but the operation of provisional review does not
depend on finding the enforcement power in section 5 plenary. Congressional power to reverse,
modify, or otherwise alter the Court's interpretation of rights under section 1 would nevertheless be plenary under Article I, section 8, subject only to the external limits imposed, for
example, by the Bill of Rights. See infra note 116.
88. Other limits on congressional power may arise from interpretation of Article III. For
example, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court interpreted clause 2
of section 2 as denying Congress the power to expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Similarly, the Court has interpreted "case or controversy" as a restriction limiting any
judicial action to a process of adjudication. See, eg., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911); L. TaxnE, supra note 1, at 52-109. In United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (19 Wall.) 128
(1872), the Court interpreted the grant of judicial power "to one Supreme Court and such
lower courts as Congress may establish" as denying Congress the power to tell the Court how
to decide a pending case. Some take this line of argument further and posit that Congress may
not act in a fashion that strips the Supreme Court of its "essential role." See Hart, The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 1362 (1953). Similarly, the Court has suggested that judicially prescribed remedies for
federal violations of the Bill of Rights may be altered by Congress, but only to the extent that
Congress substitutes "equally effective" alternatives. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
This holding is consistent with the primary Marbury power of judicial review: the Court has
the duty to interpret the external limits on all federal action imposed by the Constitution.
Although the shibboleth of tailoring the remedy to fit the violation fails to comprehend the
nature of this function of judicial review, the Court cannot allow Congress, acting in the guise
of promulgating alternative remedies, to undercut the values interpreted into the external limits by the Court. Cf. Fiss, supra note 1; Dimond, supra note 69. Apparently, even Choper
agrees that the Court should decide such separation of powers disputes involving its own turf.
Compare note 14 supra, with J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 380-413.
Personal rights may also be inferred from the federal structure of the Constitution. See C.
BLACK, supra note 15. As discussed in part IIA supra, the Court's role in framing and refereeing such issues in the first instance is critical; however, if the federal structure imposes no
external limit on congressional power, Congress retains the final power to resolve any federalism issue. See supra note 41.
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section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be overturned by

Congress.
The framework for dialogue over rights under provisional review
can now be brought into sharp focus: unless an external limit restricts
congressional power, Congress may reverse, modify, or expand the

Court's interpretation of rights under section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Only the Court's interpretation of external limits restricts
the power of Congress to overturn the Court's decisions interpreting section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Consider, for example, a judicial interpretation of the Privileges or

Immunities Clause of section 1 that declares political speech a fundamental national right of United States citizens. Based on this interpretation,
the Court strikes down a state law prohibiting criticism of the governor's
political acts. This decision directly binds the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and it cannot be overturned by Congress to the extent that the Court also interprets the First Amendment as prohibiting
Congress from making any law abridging political speech.8 9 The Court,
then, has the final authority to trump a congressional act that seeks to
overturn a judicial interpretation of political speech as a national right.9"
Under its traditional power of judicial review,9 1 the Court may interpret
the First Amendment as an external limit restricting congressional power
92
to pass such a law.

The Court may play this Bill of Rights trump over congressional
89. Interpreting the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause as protecting the "marketplace" of political ideas offers one plausible interpretive choice. See, eg., Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Bork, supra note 6; Meildejoln, The
FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 245 (1961).
90. If judicial interpretation of the Free Speech Clause is limited to political speech, the
Court's role is representation reinforcing rather than anti-majoritarian. See J. ELY, supra note
2, at 105-16. The Court could then choose to promote a dialogue with Congress over personal
rights by interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
protecting other forms of expression against state restriction. Consider, for example, a
Supreme Court decision striking down state suppression of self-actualizing expression as violating a citizen's fundamental national rights under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Such
expression falls outside the core of political speech absolutely protected by the First Amendment. See supra note 89. Nevertheless, such expression is so fundamental that it should not be
abridged by the States. See, ag., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6
(1970); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 578-79, 588, 900, 906. Under provisional review, such an
interpretation would bind the States, but Congress would be free to respond to the Court's
decision so long as Congress addressed the merits of the issue on a principled basis without
prejudice and without abridging the First Amendment. Given this understanding, provisional
review might encourage the Court to protect expression relating to self-actualization, personal
development, and individual conscience from abridgment by the states.
91. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) (1803). See also W. LOCKRART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITONAL LAW 8-30 (1980).

92. See L.

TRIBE,

supra note 1, at 272 & n.61; Cohen, supra note 87, at 620.
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acts in other areas as well.9 3 When interpreting external limits on enumerated congressional powers, the Court's decision is final and binding,94
but the scope of the Court's power depends on the extent of the external
limits placed on congressional power by the Bill of Rights. Although a
range of interpretive choices exists, there is a core theme that can be used
to guide the Court's choice. With the exception of the Third and Eighth
Amendments, citizens' rights against the national government primarily
guarantee a representation reinforcing framework for the informed operation of the democracy.9 5

This theme does not deny that the first eight amendments also guarantee important individual rights, but only suggests that in the framework of provisional review they operate directly as external limits on the
enumerated powers of the national government. They establish the
structure within which informed citizens can fully and freely participate
in a representative democracy, rather than dictate particular substantive
outcomes.9 6 Under this approach, the final and binding power of judicial
review preserves the structure of the process by which the people and
their representatives make public decisions, rather than overseeing the
distribution of society's goods, services, benefits, and burdens. A dialogue between the Court and the people through Congress decides which
substantive rights to guarantee. While Court decisions interpreting substantive national rights under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
bind the states, they are not final as against Congress.97
93. These areas would include free exercise and nonestablishment of religion, press, petition, and assembly (First Amendment); unreasonable search and seizure and warrants (Fourth
Amendment); double jeopardy, self-incrimination, just compensation when taking property
(Fifth Amendment); notice of charges, jury trial, confrontation, counsel, compulsory process
(Sixth and Seventh Amendments); excessive bail, excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth Amendment); and deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law (Fifth Amendment). Each of these clauses, like the Free Speech Clause, guarantees individual rights against the national government.
94. The congressional power over jurisdiction enumerated in Article III should also be
subject to the same external limits that apply to all other congressional powers. Suppose, for
example, the Court had decided that political speech was a national privilege or immunity of
United States citizens and Congress responded by passing a statute depriving the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction to review whether such speech was a privilege or immunity. The Court
could interpret the First Amendment as an external limit on this congressional power by holding that the act abridges freedom of speech. See supra notes 87, 92.
95. Cf J. ELY, supra note 2, at 63-69 (representation reinforcing values as limit to final
judicial interpretation of Constitution). In this democracy, a wall of separation between
Church and State has also been erected to avoid mixing religion and government, and fundamentally fair procedures are required when government confronts the individual.
96. Id.
97. This approach is consistent with the approach to judicial review of federalism disputes
discussed in part IIA supra. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on states
not to abridge the privileges or immunities of United States citizens. The Court resolves any
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The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, offers
additional support for the Court's power to override congressional acts
by interpreting external limits. First, it can incorporate the same procedural protections against federal action as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes on state action. "Due process of law"
can also apply to congressional lawmaking, including a sensitive search
to ferret out naked we-they preferences that might infect the legislative
process.9" This application strengthens the basic premise that representation reinforcing values should guide interpretation of the other external
limits on congressional power.99 The Court's decision in Boiling v.
Sharp"°° struck down federal statutes tainted by just such prejudice.
There, caste distinctions infected the legislative perpetuation of segregation in Washington, D.C. public schools. The Court held that "segrega-

tion in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective." 101
controversy between a state and an individual over claims of deprivations of national rights,
but Congress retains the ultimate power (unless barred by an external limit) to decide this
federalism dispute. It may set a different national policy for substantive rights or authorize the
states to establish different policies. As discussed in part IIB supra, this approach is also one
way of interpreting congressional enforcement power under section 5 as plenary, subject to the
external limits on all congressional power. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
99. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 135-70.
100. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
101. 347 U.S. at 500. Justice Murphy made this same interpretive choice more directly in
his dissent in Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233.
A tougher issue, however, is whether this undue process "deprived" any person of "liberty" or "property." One way to resolve this question is to first determine if public education
for Washington, D.C., children is an entitlement. If so, the only issue remaining is whether the
racial restrictions in the dual school law "deprived" any person of that property interest.
"Partial" deprivations and restrictions are enough to trigger due process review. See, eg.,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In these circumstances, the caste system amounted to a
severe "deprivation" in the form of official racial restrictions on schooling for all children in
the District of Columbia.
Another way to approach the question asks whether reputation is a property interest and,
if so, whether the District of Columbia's "Jim Crow" system of schooling deprived any person
of his or her interest in a good name. Under this approach, the purpose and stigmatizing effect
of the dual school law was to treat blacks as inherently inferior. It is hard to imagine a greater
official slander of a person or a more direct deprivation of any property interest in a good
name. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557-60 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-27 (1960); Calm, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150,
158 (1955); Dimond, supra note 69, at 23-25; Dimond, supra note 7, at 508-11.
In Bolling v. Sharp, however, Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court that the system of
forced segregation "imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause" of
the Fifth Amendment. 347 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added). This holding appears to represent a
substantive due process ruling, albeit one 180 degrees removed from Taney's alternative hold-
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The crucial question for provisional review, however, is whether the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause should also receive substantive
content. The first eight amendments contain no substantive rights provision akin to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Two choices are available: interpret Fifth Amendment
due process as relating to substantive restrictions regardless of the procedure used, or interpret it solely as a procedural protection. The first
choice would insulate most judicial interpretations of substantive rights
from congressional reversal.102 The second choice would give Congress
ultimate authority over the substantive rights of individuals against the
states, as well as against the federal government.
Regardless of which Fifth Amendment path is followed, the heretofore dormant Ninth Amendment may limit congressional power in just
the same fashion as the Privileges or Immunities Clause restricts state
discretion. The Ninth Amendment may act as an external limit to restrict
congressional power whenever Congress denies "rights retained by the
people," 10'3 but this literal interpretation is not compelled. The text permits an alternative reading: the Ninth Amendment augments the Tenth
Amendment by explicitly reserving individual rights under state law
from federal encroachment. Some Framers feared that the new federal
government posed a greater threat than the states to individual liberty.
Indeed, before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the entire
Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, not to the states. 04
Lug in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S 393, 427 (1857). Yet Bolling can also be understood as
holding that the same racial defect that infected the legislation itself constituted the deprivation of liberty: "[S]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective," 347 U.S. at 499- 500, but instead amounts to the most naked type of
prejudice. This patent racial defect led to passage, retention, and enforcement of the Jim Crow
school law. If there is a liberty interest in being free from government caste discrimination, it
is a patent deprivation of liberty without due process of law when such caste distinctions infect
any official decisionmaking process. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. at 225-33 (Robdissenting).
erts, J.,
102. See supra notes 87, 92. The Court's notorious brush with interpreting such a "substantive" due process external limit on all federal action in Dred Scott should give pause.
There, Chief Justice Taney argued that a congressional act limiting the spread of slavery deprived the master of his property interest in his slave without due process of law. In responding to such fundamental "moral" judgments about substantive rights, some form of dialogue
between the Court and the people should exist as an alternative to civil war and constitutional
amendment.
103. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX. For diverse discussions of the possible meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, compare J. ELY, supra note 2, at 34-41; Laycock, supra note 11, at 348-56; and
C. BLACK, supra note 7, at 44-56, with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting); Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1980); and
Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 207
(1981).
104. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
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That view seems consistent with the notion that the Ninth Amendment
should not be read as an open-ended clause guaranteeing unenumerated
national rights. Rather, it only counsels against interpreting "rights"
enumerated in the federal Constitution to undercut individual personal
rights secured by state law. 105
Thus, the Ninth Amendment provides a final interpretive choice.
The right answer may depend, at least in part, on the impact a particular
choice has on the nature of the dialogue between the Court and the people. The Ninth Amendment is available to the Court if it wishes to impose an external limit on the power of Congress to overturn or to modify
substantive rights interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
that would otherwise bind only the states. When the Court utilizes the
Ninth Amendment as its ultimate trump card, however, the Court's dialogue with the people reverts to constitutional amendment, as with Dred
Scott 10 6 and Oregon v. Mitchell, 107 or erosion and reversal, as with Lochner,10 8 Hammer v. Dagenhart,109 and National League of Cities v.
Usery.110
Under provisional review, the Court would refrain from using the
Ninth Amendment as an ultimate trump in order to allow the people,
through their congressional representatives, to participate in the dialogue
over which fundamental national rights should be immune from any governmental interference, federal and state alike. The Court's role would
then be: (1) to posit substantive national rights by interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;"' (2) to
guarantee, through nonconstitutional powers of statutory construction
and legislative remand, that any congressional responses directly address
105. This interpretation of the Ninth Amendment may also affect the Court's construction
of congressional statutes and initial refereeing of federalism tensions in diversity cases, cf. Ely,
The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974), as well as its general refusal to
review state court decisions based upon independent and adequate state law grounds. See, eg.,
Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 365 U.S.
525 (1958); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1875). Generally, Congress should have ultimate power to resolve federalism issues
provided it does not breach any external limits nor infringe on the exclusive power of the
judiciary under Article III. See supra note 88. This approach also preserves the capacity of
state courts and state constitutions to create and to protect substantive individual rights under
state laws that do not conflict with the United States Constitution or federal statutes. See
Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489
(1977).
106. 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (discussed supra, note 101).
107. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
108. See supra note 63.
109. See supra notes 44-46.
110. See supra notes 47-53.
111. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
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the merits of the issue;112 and (3) to guarantee, through First and Fifth
Amendment interpretation, that the congressional lawmaking process
will be fully informed and open, truly representative, and free of invidi113
ous we-they influences.
Naturally, this framework for provisional review and for restructuring the dialogue between the Court and the people involves choosing
among values. The choice is not dictated by the Constitution, but it is
authorized. Part III therefore examines whether to adopt provisional review or to keep the type of final and binding judicial review and limited
dialogue that, at least in theory, we now have.

I.

Provisional Review in Perspective

A. Relation to Traditional Doctrines
Under the provisional form of judicial review, federalism and most
substantive rights i,:.sues are treated similarly. The Court interprets the
Constitution to resolve controversies between state and federal governments over the allocation of decisionmaking authority and the structure
of our federalism, and between states and individuals over fundamental
personal rights. This approach is authorized by the relevant text and

structure of the Constitution and supported by major doctrinal traditions
established by the Court.114

Following the Court's initial resolution, decisions in both types of
cases become subject to oversight by Congress, acting pursuant to its
112. See supra notes 75-79, 82 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 69-73, 98-101 and accompanying text. It may seem counterintuitive
to some that judicial interpretation of substantive rights under section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would bind the states but not Congress. Yet the result is inevitable if the restrictions on the federal government contained in the Bill of Rights are read as excluding any openended substantive rights limit while the restrictions on the states contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment are read as including such a limitation. Moreover, this alternative structure for
judicial review makes sense if the Court is to be able to stimulate a principled dialogue over
fundamental substantive values. The Court may strike down offending local actions, but Congress retains ultimate power to legislate a different national consensus or to authorize diverse
responses among the states. Under this structure, Congress would not challenge the Court's
authority by overturning judicial interpretations of substantive rights decisions limiting the
states. Instead, Congress would exercise its enumerated powers, subject to judicial review of
the external limits on all congressional power. The Court would choose not to interpret these
limits as including an open-ended substantive rights restriction comparable to that imposed on
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Even Ely concedes that "the problems of democracy" for judicial review under such an alternative structure "are substantially attenuated." J.
ELY, supranote 2, at 187 n.13. The availability of such an approach demonstrates that judicial
review of substantive rights need not conflict with the democratic character of the
Constitution.
114. See supra parts IIA-B.
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enumerated powers. At this point the Court can constrain congressional
action only by imposing limits on the lawmaking process, for example, by
interpreting external limits of the Bill of Rights that bind all federal actions. This last element in provisional review is also authorized by the
relevant text and structure of the Constitution and supported by major
doctrinal traditions established by the Court. 1 '5 In this sense, provisional review is unexceptional. It does, however, articulate a coherent
and consistent framework-a general theory of judicial review-for understanding the Court's diverse functions in adjudicating cases that arise
under the Constitution.
The alternative approach does posit one fundamental change from
current Supreme Court doctrine: the external limits on all federal action
imposed by the Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause would be largely confined to procedural fairness, including
prohibition of purposeful discrimination, and would exclude most substantive rights limitations. Except in rare circumstances, the Court
would refrain from substituting interpretation of the Ninth Amendment
for the substantive rights interpretations previously given the Due Process Clause.' 16 The result would be significant. Although the Court's
substantive rights interpretations of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would continue to bind the states, they usually would be subject to
modification or reversal by Congress provided it acted consistently with
the fair lawmaking procedures of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 117
In addition, provisional review would build upon available nonconstitutional doctrines of statutory construction and legislative remand to
115. See supra part IIC.
116. Provisional review also posits that the Court will choose to limit interpretation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to fair process and to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the substantive national right clause binding on the states. Consistent with the general theory of judicial review, this alternative also suggests that the Court
review any internal limits on Congress' section 5 enforcement power under the same deferential standards for review of congressional powers enumerated under Article I, section 8. But
these three significant changes from traditional doctrine are not preconditions for the effective
operation of this alternative framework for dialogue. As long as the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause is limited to fair procedure, and the Ninth Amendment is not substituted as a
substantive rights limit on congressional power, Congress may respond directly under its comprehensive commerce and spending powers to judicial interpretation under section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of national substantive rights.
117. Arguably, substantive external limits on congressional power can be imposed by judicial interpretations of the Third and Eighth Amendments. The modern Court, however, has
issued few-if any-decisions imposing other substantive rights restrictions on congressional
power. In particular, the modern Court has not used substantive due process to strike down
many acts of Congress.
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insure that congressional representatives actually addressed the merits of
the fundamental issues presented. For example, the Court could use rational relationship review "with teeth" or a suspensive veto to remand
congressional responses that do not fit the articulated purposes of the
statute. 11 8 Statutory construction and clear statement requirements
could also be invoked to the same end. 1 9 Add to this the Court's ability
to use the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as a constraint on biased decisionmaking, and it becomes apparent that the Court would have
the power and the responsibility to structure a principled dialogue over
substantive rights. This power would represent a significant judicial

check on congressional determination of national rights, but it would not
divest Congress of ultimate control. 12 0 With minor exceptions, the
Court's Marbury power of final and binding judicial review would be
limited to imposing procedural and structural restraints on the process
by which Congress decided issues of federalism and substantive national
rights.
Nevertheless, the Court would have a prominent, albeit not final,
role in resolving federalism disputes and positing fundamental national
substantive rights. But consistent with the democratic character of the
118. See supra notes 69-82, 98-101 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 53 and text accompanying notes 75-79; cf. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purposeand the JudicialProcess, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
120. Ely's suggestion that the nonconstitutional aspects of these restraints on the congressional lawmaking process are misguided may be premised on his apparent assertion that the
Court should have no role in interpreting substantive national rights. See J. ELY, supra note 2,
at 125-36. But this Article meets Ely's challenge, see supra notes 12, 113, by suggesting an
alternative form of judicial review that permits judicial interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with the democratic character of the
Constitution. Provisional review provides for a continuing, structured dialogue between the
Court and the people through their congressional representatives. Fundamental issues of
human rights, national conscience, and morality should not be treated as merely ordinary
policy disputes decided at the whim of respresentative institutions. These issues are special
and have been viewed as such for over a century by the Court, the Congress, and the people.
If Congress cannot decide such issues on the merits, see M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 100,
then provisional review should be rejected altogether rather than retain judicial supervision to
insure that Congress at least tries to decide such issues on the basis of reason and principle.
Issues concerning fundamental substantive national rights ought not be resolved by logrolling,
special interest groups, or even national referenda. After all, the Constitution authorizes a
representativedemocracy. See THE FEDERALisT No. 10 (J. Madison). Is it too much for the
Court to ask that the national legislators, each of whom has taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution, decide the fundamental rights issues on the basis of principle rather than just as
barometers responsive only to election returns? If Ely's answer to this question remains "yes,"
then his representation reinforcing approach (a) exalts form over both substance and liberal
dialogue and (b) makes his discussion of substantive rights interpretations of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause idle sport.
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Constitution, judicial interpretations of the relevant text and structure
would be subject to direct modification by Congress.

At first blush this form of judicial review might offend defenders of
state sovereignty. Yet section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
duties directly upon the states. To the extent that those duties are interpreted by the Court or enforced by Congress, the states give up their
sovereignty under the Constitution. 12 1 Even the staunchest proponents

of state sovereignty on the Burger Court have recognized this fact. 122
Thus, it should come as a relief to defenders of "our federalism" that
provisional review (a) recognizes the power of states to grant additional
substantive rights that are not inconsistent with federal law, and (b) authorizes Congress to empower the states to promulgate diverse responses
rather than have Congress enact its own uniform national standard or
acquiesce in the Court's position. As the representative body for all the
people, Congress should be free to determine by ordinary legislation
23
whether a national standard or diverse state responses should govern.1
B. Impact of Provisional Review on Prior Decisions
With this understanding of provisional review, its impact on prior
Court decisions concerning three critical issues can be evaluated.
L

Enforcement Acts

Under provisional review, congressional enforcement acts under the
post-Civil War amendments would be reviewed pursuant to the same
standard applied to congressional acts passed under Article 1, section 8.
121. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
122. See supra notes 53, 121. The Burger Court's federalism decisions are now moving
toward this understanding. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. Indeed, in the one
instance since 1937 when the Court imposed a "state sovereignty" limit on congressional
power to promote individual rights under the post-Civil War amendments, the people responded with a constitutional amendment. Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
with U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. Moreover, as personal rights and state duties are interpreted
to fall within the scope of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's continued
reliance on the Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), "clear statement" rule of construction
and on the fiction of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to limit citizen suits against the
states in federal court is misplaced. Both have led the Court to search for individual wrongdoers in resolving claims of Fourteenth Amendment violations, rather than on a broader inquiry
into any breach of duty a state, as a whole, owes to any person under section 1. In contrast, a
clear statement rule for construing congressional responses to judicial interpretation of state
duties and personal rights under section 1 would not serve a mischievous purpose; instead, it
would assist Congress in addressing the merits of the substantive rights issues on a principled
basis free of caste-based taints.
123. See supra part IIA.
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Thus, for example, the Civil Rights Cases12 4 would have been decided the
other way, in a fashion similar to Katzenbach v. McClung,125 Heart1of
27
1 26
Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States or Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

Did Congress have a rational basis for concluding that (a) racial discrimination by common carriers, inns, and theaters amounts to a badge or
incident of slavery (section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment); (b) access
to common carriers, inns, and theaters is a privilege or immunity of na-

tional citizenship (section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); (c) the
state's failure to afford blacks equal access to common carriers, inns, and
theaters amounts to an invidious racial defect in the state's lawmaking
process (section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); or (d) racial discrimination in access to common carriers, inns, and theaters affects interstate
commerce (Article I, section 8, clause 3)? If so, did Congress choose
appropriate means to regulate the activity so that its actions fell within
the scope of its enumerated powers?

Under this view, the constitutional power of Congress to pass the
1875 Civil Rights Act cannot be questioned. Congressional power to
"enforce" or to create national rights-whether under the enforcement
sections of the Reconstruction amendments or the powers enumerated in

Article I, section 8-is comprehensive, subject to the external limits on
all congressional power contained in the Bill of Rights.

28

2. Substantive Rights.
How would a case like Roe v. Wade129 be decided under provisional
review? Although premised on an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the opinion posits a substantive na124. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See supra note 83.
125. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in restaurants, as a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause power).
126. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, as a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause power).
127. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars all discrimination in the
public or private sale of rental property and is a valid exercise of Congress' power to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment). But see 6 C. FAIRmAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 1207-58 (1971).
128. Under this view, the decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), upholding congressional power to ban literacy tests in state elections, would stand, but the dictum in
footnote 10, reading the phrase "to enforce" in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
imposing some kind of "ratchet" permitting Congress to expand but not limit national rights
under section 5, would be stricken. Similarly, the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970), restricting congressional power to declare the right of 18-year olds to vote in
state elections, would fall. Congress would have the power under section 5 to declare such a
right a national privilege or immunity, and the Court would defer to Congress on any resulting
federalism dispute between state sovereignty and national authority. See supra part HA.
129. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tional right, a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child. This
right is related closely to the personhood, autonomy, and privacy line of
cases beginning with Pierce v. Society of Sisters13 and followed by Skinner v. Oklahoma,13 1 Griswold v. Connecticut,132 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird.1 33 In terms of the gradual, case-by-case process of extending decisional rules by analogy and limiting them by substantive distinctions,
Roe is hardly remarkable. Under provisional review, the Court would
have addressed the fundamental issues of morality and national conscience raised by abortion13 ' by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment

Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Roe's result would be to posit a national right binding against the
states. Women would be free to terminate any pregnancy pursuant to the
conditions established by the Court, subject only to modification by (a)

future interpretations by the Court, (b) constitutional amendment, or (c)
congressional action-either redefining the national right or authorizing

the states to promulgate diverse responses. This process, however, is not
a radical departure from traditional constitutional analysis.
Modification through judicial evolution is not a process of finding a

pre-ordained natural law; rather, it involves a complex process of
growth, survival, erosion, or reversal in the context of adjudication. 135 It
has long included aspects of dialogue with the people and Congress, as
well as different understandings of the basic moral issues, the right answers, or the best instincts of our national conscience over time.
Whether in a time frame of several decades 136 or just a few years, 1 3 7 the
130. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon law requiring students between the ages of 8 and 16 to
attend public school held to violate the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children).
131. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation held to be a basic liberty).
132. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penalizing married couples for using contraceptives held to violate the fundamental right of privacy).
133. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried couples held to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
134. Those issues include a woman's interests in making the final decisions concerning her
own body, childbearing, and childrearing, as well as the burdens she is willing to bear on
behalf of the fetus versus the interest of the fetus in birth and the state's interest in life.
135. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 1; Sandalow, supra note 7; Wellington, supra notes 7, 27.
136. Fifty-eight years passed before Brown finally overturned Plessy and the doctrine of
"separate but equal."
137. Compare Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) with West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In just three years the Court reversed its
position regarding a compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegience in public schools. Expressly overruling Gobitis, Barnette held that action by local authorities compelling the flag
salute and pledge exceeded constitutional limitations on their power by infringing the spirit of
the First Amendment.
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Court's binding decisions have not always proven final. They posit provisional answers that the people eventually accept or the Court modifies
or rejects. Also, in the course of our constitutional history the people
have sometimes responded to the Court's interpretations of federalism
and individual fights issues with constitutional amendments. 138 The two
processes of evolution and amendment allow the people to respond to the
Court's constitutional interpretations and permit the Court and the people to engage in a moral dialogue.
Provisional review simply provides a more direct way for the people
and their representatives to respond to the Court's positing of substantive
national fights and to participate in a moral dialogue over fundamental
issues. For example, subject to the external limits imposed by judicial
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, Congress would have comprehensive
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce
Clause to reverse Roe on the merits and to prohibit abortions under any
circumstances. Congress could do so by finding that a fetus is a person
and that its personal fight to life outweighs the mother's constitutional
interest in her bodily autonomy, or that the ramifications, costs, and cumulative effects of abortion adversely affect interstate commerce. With
respect to internal limits, the Court would only ask: did Congress have a
rational basis for its finding and, if so, did Congress enact appropriate
means to implement this end?
The Court would, however, retain power to structure the process by
which the people and their representatives conduct the moral dialogue
over the abortion issue. Thus, the Court could interpret the Fifth
Amendment's external limit on due process of law to prohibit Congress
from passing a law banning abortions if Congress was influenced by an
anti-female bias. For example, if Congress flatly prohibited abortions
without considering the unique burden it would impose on women, the
Court might suspect that congressional resolution of the fundamental
moral dilemma between the life of the fetus and the bodily freedom of the
mother had been influenced by something" akin to male chauvinist dis1 39
dain for women.
In such circumstances, the Court might remand to Congress for reconsideration and suggest that if the sole, articulated, and genuinely nondiscfiminatory goal of the statute was to protect the life of the fetus, then
138. See supra note 25.
139. Compare Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) with Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation held to be a basic liberty) and L. TRIBE, supra
note 1, at 1010-11 (the decision to treat a right as fundamental may be based on a concern that
government may oppress the powerless if granted discretionary power in a particular area).
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why had Congress made no provisions for men-if not the federal and
state governments-to share in the burdens of the woman's pregnancy?
For example, Congress could have considered whether a father or the
state should pay for the costs of any unwanted pregnancy, including
compensating the unwilling bearer of the fetus for pain, emotional suffering, lost economic opportunities, and rehabilitation. A remand to Congress for reconsideration would be appropriate if the Court suspected
that a male-dominated legislative process relied on archaic stereotypes in
reaching its decision without considering the wrenching burdens that
childbearing imposes on women who do not share the view that the government can decide the uses to which their bodies and their destinies can
be put. 140
Consider the situation if Congress passed a statute merely forbidding abortion except when the woman had been raped or the pregnancy
would threaten her health. The Court could construe the statute as not
being intended to reverse or to modify the operative rules of Roe: that is,
it could be interpreted as authorizing the mother, in conjunction with her
physician, to retain power to make the personal decision of bearing or
aborting the fetus based on her general mental health and well-being.
Through such statutory construction, the Court could remand the issue
to Congress to insure that the people's representatives decide the issue on
the basis of principle rather than by national referendum or in-house log
rolling. 14 1 When reversing or modifying the Court's fundamental rights
rulings, Congress must legislate unequivocally on the merits to achieve a
national consensus among competing political factions.14 2
Finally, consider the situation if Congress passed a statute next year
directly modifying Roe by authorizing states to replace the Roe guidelines with their own standards, provided that the unwilling mother was
compensated for her burden and a pregnancy that seriously threatened a
woman's life could be aborted. Assume Congress passed this law on the
basis of principle, and its lawmaking process was not tainted by invidious
discrimination against women. Assume further that the Court deferred
to Congress and found the legislation constitutional. Thereafter, the
political debate turns for the next ten years to the states, and twenty-five
adopt no such law, thereby leaving Roe intact in those states. The other
140. See supra notes 75-78, 82, 98-101 and accompanying text.
141. On three occasions, the Court similarly read congressional anti-busing riders narrowly
as not intended to overturn or to modify judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1971); 2 N. DORSEN, P.
BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

693-94, 701-02 (1979).
142. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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twenty-five states do enact such a statute, free of any anti-women bias,
but by 1995 fifteen states repeal those laws through state legislative, constitutional, or judicial action. The Court might then be warranted once
again in interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause as guaranteeing
women a national right to control their own bodies. The changed legal
landscape might well authorize the Court to posit that national substantive right and bind the remaining ten states with conflicting anti-abortion
laws. But the people, through their representatives in Congress, would
still be free to determine by ordinary legislation whether there should be
1 43
such a national right binding on all states.
Under provisional review, moreover, most people might still view
the Court's initial substantive rights decisions in cases like Roe as persuasive if not authoritative. The mystique of finding specific answers from
the Framers or the mantle of binding finality would be removed. But
those myths might be replaced by honest recognition that the Court can
act as a forum of principle, searching for right answers or the best instincts of the evolving national conscience. The Court would lead, shape,
and structure dialogue with the people, rather than resolve for all time
fundamental human rights issues. The Court's respect and legitimacy
would depend even more than it does now on the persuasiveness of its
reasoning and the substance of its decisions, as well as on its discretion in
knowing when to duck. 1"
3. Anti-Caste Principles
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education
and subsequent per curiam decisions 1 " interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause as barring states from enacting, enforcing, or perpetuating segregation in schools and other aspects of community life. Under
provisional review, how would the Court review a congressional act seeking to reverse that judgment? Initially, a number of nonconstitutional
techniques of statutory construction and legislative remand might enable
the Court to avoid a direct confrontation by allowing Congress to recon1 45

143. See G.

CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 113, 129-31, 135-

38, 164-66 (1982).
144. CompareBickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) with Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues," 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
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sider its action. 147
If Congress insisted on passing a statute directly reversing or substantially modifying the judgment, the Court would have no choice but
to review its constitutionality. Assuming that Congress acted within the
scope of its enumerated powers, the Court would then determine whether
any external limit on all congressional power-in this case the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause-had been violated.1 48 By enacting a
statute that reversed Brown, was Congress influenced by a naked we-they
preference in which the white in-group viewed the black out-group as
inherently inferior and undeserving of respect and concern as persons?
Did the act seek to impose or to perpetuate a badge of inferiority on the
out-group? Under provisional review, the Court has the ultimate responsibility and final power to strike down any act of Congress that is tainted
by such invidious discrimination in violation149of the Fifth Amendment's
external due process limit on federal action.

Conclusion
This Article asked at the outset how judicial interpretations of the
Constitution that are authorized but not compelled can be viewed as final
and binding consistent with democratic principles. At the core of this
dilemma is the stubborn fact that the text and Framers' intent do not
always compel particular answers, but open a range of choices that cannot be narrowed solely by finding an answer from the past. In one sense,
the alternative form of judicial review explored in this Article offers another choice; it provides a means for Congress rather than the Court to
have the final word on most substantive policy choices. Nor does provisional review offer many insights into how the Court should define and
apply substantive national rights against the states. Instead, it offers a
mechanism by which the people can respond more directly through their
congressional representatives to the Court's positing of fundamental national rights. Judicial oversight of Congress insures, however, that its
lawmaking process is democratic and focused on the merits of the issue.
147. See supra notes 53, 75, 82, 118, 140-141 and accompanying text. In contrast, if Congress promulgated alternative remedies designed to address such caste-based segregation rather
than to undercut the judgment, the Court would welcome the help. See supra note 82.
148. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
149. The Court's "final" interpretation of the external limits that bind Congress, however,
is subject to reversal or modification over time by the processes of constitutional amendment
and evolution discussed above. In this sense, even the Court's interpretations of these external
limits that bind congressional action are also provisional and depend, ultimately, on the
Court's ability to persuade the people that they are right under the Constitution.
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Although provisional review may not differ dramatically from current doctrine, it presents a radical departure from the common understanding that all Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution
are final and binding unless overturned by constitutional amendment.
Although this common understanding may seem exaggerated when looking back at the rise and fall of various doctrines over time, it does reflect
a basic truth for any particular Supreme Court ruling. The myth of the
Court as final arbiter does usually cause the people to reflect and their
representatives to pause.
The practical truth for our time may be that the people have come
to look at the Court as one of the constitutional institutions that define
and guarantee our personal liberties against any government, federal as
well as state. Given the substance of what the modem Court has interpreted as personal rights, most people believe that our faith in the
Supreme Court has not been misplaced. There is also the fear that Congress, as a representative institution always looking to re-election, simply
cannot be trusted to decide fundamental issues of conscience on any basis
other than temporary popularity or expediency. Perhaps the Court and
the people already join in substantial resonance concerning what are the
fundamental personal rights of each generation, and when they do not,
perhaps the traditional means of judicial evolution and constitutional
amendment provide enough of a democratic check on the Court's deviations from the people's ,tolerance to justify reliance on the Court as a
better forum of principle than the Congress.150
This common understanding serves as its own democratic justification for the Court to act as the final arbiter of substantive human rights
as well as of representation reinforcing values. It also counsels caution in
150. For Tribe, supra note I, at 892, this process of resonance is aided by the form of the
Court's substantive rights decisions concerning, for example, "personhood." Thus, in Roe v.
Wade, a woman's fundamental right to decide whether she should bear a child is not absolute,
but is weighed against the state's important interests in the potential life of the fetus and the
mother's health. Such strict but not necessarily fatal "scrutiny of any governmental action or
deliberate omission that appears to transgress what it means to be human at any given time or
place" should help to encourage "wise reflection" by the people and their representatives.
Although Tribe is understandably skeptical of the merits of the Court's subsequent decisions,
supra note 1, at 933-34, n.77, Maher v. Roe and Harrisv. McRae show that (a) some kind of
dialogue is going on and (b) the Court is neither finally invalidating nor summarily rejecting all
legislative attempts to disagree with the substance of the Court's moral judgment in Roe v.
Wade. Yet Tribe, in the final analysis, argues that any such flexibility in defining and defending fundamental rights against all government action must ultimately be decided by the Court
(or other forum of constitutional principle), not by majority will or national consensus. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 896. In contrast, Wellington argues that" '[w]e the people' consent [to
judicial review] . . . because we believe that, in one fashion or another, we have adequate
control over the content of the law that governs us." Wellington, supra note 7, at 335.

240

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 12:201

choosing to interpret the Constitution to provide for provisional review.
At most, the Court, the people, and their representatives in Congress
should move slowly, if at all, toward any such alternative. As first steps,
some Justices on the Court might consider whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a more straightforward textual source than the Due Process Clause for interpreting
substantive national rights the next time a case like Roe v. Wade or
Moore v. East Cleveland15 ' comes along. Or the next time Congress considers legislating to guarantee a personal right, 152 it could rely on its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to define
a privilege or immunity of national citizenship binding against the states.
By moving toward an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause that supports provisional review, we
might all gain a little experience before embarking on an uncharted
course for judicial review. Provisional review, no matter how alluring, is
not necessarily better than the path set by the modern Court and followed by the people.' 5 3

151. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (housing ordinance limiting occupancy to single family residents
and defining family to prohibit a woman from living with her grandsons held invalid because it
arbitrarily invaded family rights).
152. Examples of personal rights include the right of handicapped persons to decent education and treatment in the least restrictive setting, the right of relatives or friends to live together, the right to travel and to relocate, and the right to some safe harbors of minimum
protection in a sea of free enterprise competition.
153. Cf. R. FROST, The Road Not Taken (1916).

